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Toward More Ethical Government:
An Inspector General for the
White House
by Kathleen Clark*
I. THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL MECHANISM:
A PROSECUTION CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST DEVICE
The independent counsel mechanism celebrates its twentieth

anniversary in 1998.' In recent years, Attorneys General have
requested the appointment of independent counsel with greater
frequency, and independent counsel are spending more time and money
conducting their investigations.2 As a result, political and academic
commentators have written extensively about the merits of, and
problems with, the Independent Counsel Statute." Other participants

* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University. Yale University (B.A., 1984;
J.D., 1990). E-mail: kathleen@wulaw.wustl.edu.
I am grateful to Bradley Joondeph and Daniel Keating, who reviewed earlier drafts of
this Article.
1. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. f§ 591-599 (1994).
2. In the Independent Counsel Statute's first four years of operation, independent
counsel were appointed three times. The median length of their investigations was seven
months, and the median cost of the investigation was less than $200,000. In the last four
years, independent counsel were appointed five times. The median length of their
investigations is about two and a half years, and the median cost of an investigation is
nearly four million dollars. See Kathleen Clark, Paying the Price for Heightened Ethics
Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways Government Officials FinanceTheir Legal
Expenses, 50 STAN. L. REV. 65, 127 (1997) (Table I).
3. See, e.g., Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy,
33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1996); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration
ofJustice: Conflictsof Interest and Independent Counsels under the Ethics in Government
Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1 (1990); Symposium, Morrison v. Olson: Addressingthe Constitutionality
of the Independent Counsel Statute, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Stephen L. Carter, The
Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Symposium on Special
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in this Symposium have produced insightful additions to this literature,
particularly with regard to the statute's historical background and the
relationship between independent counsel and attorneys general.4
This Article takes a slightly different approach, keeping in mind that
the original Independent Counsel Statute was part of an omnibus
government ethics reform bill, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.6
The independent counsel mechanism is just one part of what is
necessarily a multi-pronged effort to promote ethical government. From
this perspective, the independent counsel mechanism is little more than
a prosecution conflict-of-interest device.' It is a way of dealing with the
conflict of interest that arises when the Attorney General would
otherwise have to supervise a criminal investigation of alleged wrongdoing by the President (who appoints the Attorney General) or other highlevel executive branch officials closely aligned with the President.
Under the Independent Counsel Statute, when the Attorney General
receives information about alleged wrongdoing by a high-level executive
branch official,' she has thirty days to determine whether the informa-

Prosecutionsand the Role of the Independent Counsel, 16 HOP5RA L. REv. 1 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Katy J. Harriger, The Historyof the Independent Counsel Provisions: How
the Past Informs the CurrentDebate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489 (1998); John Q. Barrett, All
or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in
Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REv. 519 (1998).
5. In addition to creating the independent counsel mechanism, the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 restricted post-government employment for executive branch
employees, required certain employees to file financial disclosure reports, and created the
Office of Government Ethics. Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government
Yet? An Answer from FiduciaryTheory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 64-65.
6. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 3, at 6-11; Dan Reicher, Conflicts of Interest in Inspector
General, Justice Department, and Special ProsecutorInvestigationsof Agency Heads, 35
STAN. L. REV. 975 (1983). Before Congress adopted the Independent Counsel Statute, one
commentator suggested that a better way to deal with this conflict of interest would be to
depoliticize the Justice Department. Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates
Itself, 65 CAL. L. REV. 597 (1977).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b).
8. The high level officials subject to the mandatory provision of the Independent
Counsel Statute include not just the President and all cabinet officers, but also highly paid
White House and other departmental officials, as well as officers of presidential campaign
committees. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b).
A strong argument could be made that the mandatory provision should be much
narrower. In that case, the Attorney General would have to apply for appointment of an
independent counsel only if the person investigated is the President, the Vice-President,
or the Attorney General herself rather than all of the officials currently covered. Id.
§ 591(b). For example, given the apparent dispensability of Secretary of Agriculture Mike
Espy to the political fortunes of the Clinton Administration, there may have been little
reason to believe that the Attorney General could not be trusted to investigate Espy. Ann
Devroy & Susan Schmidt, Agriculture Secretary Espy Resigns; Amid Ethics Probes,
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tion is specific and the source of the information is credible.9 If both of
these criteria are met, she then must initiate a "preliminary investigation" of the allegation.1" Unless the Attorney General determines
during this ninety-day period that there are no reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted, she must petition a
special court to appoint a temporary prosecutor to lead the investigation
or prosecution."
The Independent Counsel Statute promotes ethical government in at
least two important ways. First, an independent counsel's actual
prosecution of wrongdoing, like any prosecution, may deter government
officials and others from engaging in illegal conduct' Second, on a purely
symbolic level, the existence and operation of the statute sends the
important message that every official in government, no matter how
high the office, is subject to the operation of the law. 2 Certainly
anyone familiar with the origins of the Independent Counsel Statute and
with the uproar resulting from President Nixon's firing of Watergate
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox understands the significance of this
mechanism in promoting "the rule of law."'"
On the other hand, an independent counsel investigation is undoubtedly more expensive for the subject of the investigation to defend, 4 and
it may be more expensive for the government to conduct as well.' In

Ex-Congressman Will Leave to Fightfor 'My GoodName," WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1994, at Al.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 591(d).

10. Id.
11. Id. § 592. The Attorney General also has the discretion to seek the appointment
of an independent counsel when she "determines that an investigation or prosecution of a
person by the Department of Justice may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict
of interest." Id. § 591(c)(1).
12. But see the popular and scholarly debate over whether a sitting president may be
indicted. R.W. Apple, Jr., Testing of a President; The Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1998,
at A9; Robert H. Bork, Indict Clinton? How I Wish It Were Possible,WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
1998, at A22; Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and
Removal ofFederal Judges, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 809; Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King
and the King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before
Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7 (1992) and sources cited id at n.12; Barry
Jeffrey Stern, Revealing Misconduct by Public Officials Through Grand Jury Reports, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 73, 109-11 (1987).
13. See KENNETH GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 338-62 (1997);
see also Symposium, A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute, 49
MERCER L. REv. 453, 484 (1998).
14. Clark, supra note 2, at nn. 91-92.
15. See In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (indicating that the Justice
Department would have quickly dismissed the charges against Labor Department
Secretary Raymond Donovan absent the Independent Counsel Statute); Matthew J.
Merrick, Smaltz Questions Charge That IC ProbesAre Too Long, 14 ETHICS IN Gov'T REP.
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addition, the appointment of independent counsel may have contributed
to the increased political use of ethics allegations and the decreased
public trust in government.
Within the context of criminal prosecution, the independent counsel
mechanism is quite significant. However, ethical government does not
live by criminal prosecution alone. Instead, it requires an ethical
institutional culture, which includes the increased accountability that
can come from administrative, rather than prosecutorial, mechanisms."'
II. CREATING AN ETHICAL ENVIRONMENT IN AN ORGANIZATION
Organizations wanting to promote a more ethical environment can
take a variety of steps. These include developing a code of conduct,
providing ethics training about the code, enforcing the code, and taking
other measures to promote an ethical work culture."7 The federal
government has devoted significant resources to the first three types of
activities. Thousands of federal officials are involved in drafting the
code and training employees on its operation."8 The federal government enforces ethical norms through the employment disciplinary
process, civil fines, and criminal prosecution, including prosecution
under the Independent Counsel Statute. 9 But this Article focuses on
the fourth type of activity, promotion of an ethical work culture, and
explores what the federal government has done and what more it can do
to promote an ethical work culture.
When we think of ethics, we generally think in terms of individual
ethics-the actions, decisions, and thought processes of individuals. We

(Nov. 1997).

16. See Ronald C. Moe, The HUD Scandal and the Case for an Office of Federal
Management, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298, 303 (1991) ("[Algency heads [need to] have the
capacity to address potential management problems in a systemic manner. Heavy reliance
on investigations and punishment of past management failures tends to be inefficient and
ineffective.").
17.

See MARK W. HUDDLESTON & JOSEPH C. SANDS, ENFORCING ADMINISTRATIVE

ETHICS, ETHICS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE 139 (Harry W. Reynolds, Jr. ed. 1995)

(identifying three strategies for maintaining high standards of ethical behavior: codes of
ethics, ethics police, and cultural strategies).

18. Over thirteen thousand federal officials have some responsibility for government
ethics. See Clark, supra note 5, at 67. These officials conduct training about the ethics

regulations and provide guidance to employees about how the rules apply to specific
circumstances that the employees face. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.107(b) (1998).
19. See 5 C.F.R. § 2638.501 to .508 (1998) (employment discipline); Stephen D. Potts,

Memorandum to Designated Agency Ethics Officials and Inspectors General regarding
Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey (Aug. 12, 1997) (describing the civil and criminal
prosecutions in 1996). Available at <http:/www.usoge.gov/daeogram/do97029.html>.
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judge particular individuals as ethical or unethical based on how they
respond to particular situations.
What does it mean to judge an organization as ethical or unethical?
We know the standards for judging an organization as guilty or not
guilty within the context of criminal law and liable or not liable in the
context of civil law.2' But on what basis can we judge an organization
(as opposed to an individual) as morally or ethically responsible?"' This
question has recently received some scholarly attention in the academic
literature on public administration and business ethics.2 2 It has
received rather less attention in legal academic literature. And yet,

20. See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, 1 CORPoRATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 3:01-3:11; see also
James W. Doig, Douglas E. Phillips & Tycho Manson, Placingthe Burden Where It Belongs,
in COMBATING CORRUPTION, ENCOURAGING ETHICS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR PUBLIC SERVICE

ETHICS (William L. Richter et al., eds.) (arguing that high-level executives should be held
civilly and/or criminally responsible for the wrongdoing of subordinates that they could
have prevented).
21. Dennis Thompson makes a somewhat similar inquiry as he has attempted to shift
the academic and public discussion of ethics from individual corruption to institutional
corruption. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHcs IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL To INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION (1995). See also Dennis F. Thompson, Mediated Corruption:The Case
of the Keating Five, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 369 (1993).
22. See, e.g., Kenneth Kernaghan, PromotingPublic Service Ethics: The Codification
Option, in ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE 15 (Richard A. Chapman ed. 1993); ROBERT T.
GOLEMBIEWSKI, MEN MANAGEMENT AND MORALITY: TOWARD A NEW ORGANIZATION ETHIC
(1965); Kathryn G. Denhardt, Organization Structure as a Context for Administrative
Ethics, in HANDBOOK OF ADMINISTRATWE ETHICS 169 (Terry L. Cooper ed. 1994); KATHRYN
G. DENHARDT, THE ETHICS OF PUBLIC SERVICE: RESOLVING MORAL DILEMMAS IN PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS 131-58 (1988); Kenneth Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Jr., Can a
CorporationHave A Conscience? 60 HARV. Bus. REV. 132 (1982); James A. Waters, Catch
20.5: CorporateMorality as an OrganizationalPhenomenon, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS
3-17 (1978); Howard Harris, The Role of Courage in the Establishment of an Ethical
System, Proceedings of Fourth Annual International Conference on Human Resource
Management in the Asia-Pacific Region 5.1-5.18 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Institute of Human
Resource Management, National Sun Yat-sen University) (listing a variety of ways that
organizations can encourage employees to act courageously); Charles Sampford,
InstitutionalisingPublic Sector Ethics, pp. 14-34 in ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Noel
Preston, ed. 1994) (arguing that institutional design is as important as employees' integrity
in promoting an ethical organization).
23. One does find discussions of these issues in the analysis of the Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Henry J. Amoroso, Organizational Ethos and
CorporateCriminalLiability, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47 (1995); William S. Laufer, Corporate
Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994); Pamela H. Bucy, CorporateEthos: A
Standardfor Imposing CorporateCriminalLiability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); see also
Andrea McGrath, Note, The CorporateOmbuds Office: An ADR Tool No Company Should
Be Without, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 452 (1997). For a related discussion in the
field of ethics violations by law firms, see Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline for Law

558

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

given the degree to which our lives are affected by organizations and
institutions, this question is quite important.

III.

PROMOTING "VOICE" WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS

Certainly it is the case that morally responsible individuals must be
aware of the consequences of their actions. They must remain sensitive
and responsive to others' criticisms of their actions and be ready to
reconsider those actions. Is there any analogue to this sensitivity with
respect to organizations? It seems to me that those who work in and
design organizations may have a moral obligation to structure them in
such a way that the organization will receive and respond to information
about its internal and external actions. In other words, there may be a
moral imperative to design an organization so that it will be sensitive to
the moral consequences of its own actions. '
Apart from my speculations on this issue of moral responsibility, there
is a significant body of academic literature about how to structure
organizations to be more responsive to internal and external criticisms.
The classic text in this field, Albert 0. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty shows how various organizations, ranging from private
businesses to governments, benefit from feedback they receive from their
constituents.25 The feedback may be in the form of "exit," such as when
employees leave one employer for another with a more favorable work
environment. Alternatively, it may take the form of "voice," such as
when employees express to management their dissatisfaction with the
work environment. In many cases, employees may not want to resort to
exit because of the difficulties of finding comparable work elsewhere or
because of the substantial disruption caused by a change in employment.' For that reason, institutions should be designed so that they

Firms?,77 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1991).
24. Cf DENHARDT, supra note 22, at 142-43:
"Ifwe can say that persons act responsibly only if they gather information about
the impact of their actions on others and use it in making decisions, we can
reasonably do the same for organizations.. . ." [S]ome organizations have in fact
"built features into their management incentive systems, board structures,
internal control systems.., that in a person we would call self-control, integrity,
and conscientiousness.(quoting Goodpaster & Matthews, supra note 22, at 135).
25. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE & LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
26. Id. at 96.
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can be receptive and responsive to the exercise of voice by employees and
others,"
In thinking about how to promote the ethical environment of a
particular institution, it is important to ensure the existence of informal
or formal mechanisms of voice. The federal government already has
many of these mechanisms, including whistleblower protection laws;'
financial incentives for whistleblowers; 9 toll-free hotlines for reporting
fraud, waste, and abuse;3' ombudspersons;' and inspectors general.
While some of these mechanisms, particularly whistleblowing, have
received a significant amount of scholarly attention, relatively little has
been written about the role of inspectors general.3 2

27. Richard A. Loverd, Dealing With Dissent: Learning to Listen for an Ethical
Organization, pp. 217-23 in COMBATING CORRUPTION, supra note 20; Mary P. Rowe,
OrganizationalResponse to Assessed Risk: Complaint Channels, pp. 194-95 in COMBATING
CORRUPTION, supra note 20; James L. Perry, Whistleblowing, OrganizationalPerformance,
and OrganizationalControl, in ETHICS & PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 79-99 (H. George
Frederickson ed. 1993).
28. See, e.g., DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE 1-11 (1991); Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower ProtectionAct of 1989: A False
Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991); Stephen M. Kohn & Michael D.
Kohn, An Overview of Federal and State Whistleblower Protections, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 99
(1986).
29. See, e.g., Ara Lovitt, Note, Fightfor Your Right to Litigate: Qui Tam, Article II, and
the President, 49 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1997); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead
Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: FinancialIncentives for Whistleblowing and the False
ClaimsAct, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1992); Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality
of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989).

30. During a six-month period, over ten thousand calls were made to these hotlines.
John J. Adair & Rex Simmons, From Voucher Auditing to JunkyardDogs: The Evolution
of FederalInspectors General, PUBLIC BUDGETING & FINANCE, Summer 1988, 91, 93.
31. For a discussion of ombudspersons in six federal agencies, see DAVID R. ANDERSON
& DIANE M. STOCKTON, OMBUDSMEN IN FEDERAL AGENCIES:

THE THEORY AND THE

PRACTICE (1990). See also McGrath, supra note 23.
32. Peter M. Shane, The New PublicLaw: Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or, How
Would We Know a "New PublicLaw" If We Saw It?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 837, 855 (1991) ('[Ain
institutional development worthy of intensive study [is] the advent of inspectors general.").
The few academic studies of inspectors general include: Michael Bromwich, Running
Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, GEO. L. REV. (1998); William S.
Fields, The Enigma of Bureaucratic Accountability, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 505 (1994)
(reviewing PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT-INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE
SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993)); James R. Richards & William S. Fields, The
Inspector GeneralAct: Are Its Investigative ProvisionsAdequate to Meet Current Needs?,
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227 (1990); John J.Adair & Rex Simmons, From Voucher Auditing
to Junkyard Dogs: The Evolution of Federal Inspectors General, PUBLIC BUDGETING &
FINANCE 91,96-97 (Summer 1988) (table showing history of inspector general mechanism);
Thomas W. Novotny, The IGs-A Random Walk, THE BUREAUCRAT 35 (Fall 1983); PAUL
C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR
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THE ROLE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspectors general engage in three distinct but related activities that
are relevant to this discussion. First, they investigate allegations of
wrongdoing within their agencies. When the wrongdoing rises to the
level of criminal violations, they refer the matter to the Justice
Department and sometimes aid in (but are not primarily responsible for)
the criminal prosecution. More often, their investigations are used in
the disciplining of government employees or government contractors.
Second, inspectors general provide regular audits of government
programs even in the absence of specific allegations of wrongdoing.'
Third, inspectors general make recommendations to agency heads about

how to restructure government programs for increased efficiency and

accountability.'
Inspectors general report twice a year to Congress and have become
very popular on Capitol Hill.' Inspectors general claim to have saved
the government much more money than they have cost.' Inspectors
general have their critics, primarily among those who believe inspectors
general should spend more time on the proactive improvement of
government institutions and less time on retrospective investigations of
wrongdoing.87 All cabinet-level departments, 8 and dozens of other

large and small agencies, ranging in size from the Central Intelligence

ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (1993); Paul C. Light, FederalEthics Controls: The Role ofInspectors
General,in ETHICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (H. George Frederickson ad. 1993); Adair
& Simmons, supra note 30, at 91, 96-97 (chronology of key events that have led to
strengthened internal auditing from 1777 to 1986); Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine
Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to
Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1985); Kurt W. Muellenberg & Harvey J. Volzer,
Inspector GeneralAct of 1978, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1049 (1980).
33. See William S. Fields & Thomas E. Robinson, Legal and FunctionalInfluences on
the Objectivity of the Inspector GeneralAudit Process, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 97
(1993).
34. See Adair & Simmons, supra note 30.
35. 5 U.S.C. Appi. § 5. Members of Congress are a primary constituency ofinspectors
general because inspectors general provide members with information that can be useful
in their negotiations with agencies and in hearings on the operation of agencies. See
LIGHT, supra note 32, at 51-57 (describing Congress's growing thirst for information and
how inspectors general help to satisfy that thirst).
36. See LIGHT, supra note 32, at 208 (table indicating that inspectors general claim to
save the government anywhere from $13,000 to nearly $4.5 million per employee in the
inspector general office).
37. See LIGHT, supra note 32.

38. 5 U.S.C. § 101; 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2, 11; see also Note in history section 5 U.S.C.S.
app. § 2 regarding the 1988 amendment regarding the Department of Veterans Affairs.
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Agency 39to the Appalachian Regional Commission, have inspectors
general.

Perhaps it is not surprising then that many of the scandals that have
plagued the Clinton Administration have arisen in an institution that
lacks an inspector general-the White House. The White House is one
of the few significant executive branch institutions without an inspector
general, and the Clinton White House has resisted efforts by Congress
to impose an inspector general.'
The financial irregularities that
ultimately resulted in Travelgate, the improper handling of FBI files
that resulted in Filegate, and perhaps even the incomplete response to
Congressional information requests that resulted in Videogate, might all
have been detected early and corrected by a White House inspector
general.4

39.

See LIGHT, supra note 32, at 26. The CIA's inspector general has powers somewhat

different from those in other departments due to separation of powers concerns. Pub. L.
No. 101-193. The Appalachian Regional Commission's inspector general, like those of many
other government agencies, is not appointed by the President and does not have the same
structural independence as the cabinet-level departments' inspectors general. Pub. L. No.
100-504.
40. 142 CONG. REC. E1931 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1996) (extension of remarks of Rep. John
L. Mica) ("If you can believe it.... the same people who put a bar bouncer and political
trickster in charge of White House personnel security insisted that they do not need to
meet the same oversight standards as the rest of the Government.").
41. Echoes of this sentiment are found in the House floor debate on whether to create
a White House inspector general:
I cannot think of a single White House scandal which could not have been
avoided, or at least minimized, if the President could have called upon the help
of a trusted inspector general. The secrecy of the health care task force, the waste
and fraud at the White House Communications Agency, the political firings of the
Travel Office workers, the abuse of private FBI files, the proliferation of the White
House access passes to political friends and lobbyists, and the random and
selective use of drug tests, could have all been avoided if a proper management
structure was in place.
142 CONG. REC. H10815 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Clinger).
Some of these preventable scandals later resulted in expansions of the jurisdiction of
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. See, e.g., George Lardner, Jr., Starr Gets Authority
for FBI FilesProbe; Court Gives Independent Counsel Broad Mandate, WASH. POST, June
22, 1996, at A9; Toni Locy & Susan Schmidt, Starr Given Authority to Widen Probe; At
Issue Are Accounts of Travel Office Firings,WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al.
In many non-government organizations, the General Counsel's office fulfills some of the
functions of an inspector general's office, such as conducting initial investigations of
wrongdoing. But a General Counsel's office generally does not have personnel trained to
conduct in-depth audits and make recommendations on managerial changes. In addition
to these limitations typical of any General Counsel's office, the Clinton Administration's
White House Counsel's office has been hobbled by the very rapid turnover of White House
Counsels. See Editorial, Mr. Ruffs New Job, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1997, at A20 ("Charles
Ruff becomes the fifth White House counsel since President Clinton took office four years
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When wrongdoing has occurred in the Clinton White House, the
political opposition has alleged that the wrongdoing was intentional.
The White House has defended against these charges on grounds of
staffers' incompetence rather than intentional wrongdoing.42 Even if
the White House has been correct that there has been no conspiracy or
intentional wrongdoing, that still means that the White House has major
administrative problems. Given the rapid turnover of White House
personnel, both during the transition between presidential administrations and within the current administration, as well as the lack of
institutional memory that rapid turnover implies, it is not surprising
that the White House has encountered administrative problems.'
In the 104th Congress, Representative Charles Bass introduced
legislation that would have created an inspector general for the White
House." While Bass succeeded in getting the House of Representatives
to pass the measure as part of the larger Presidential and Executive
Office Accountability Act, 46 the inspector general provision was dropped
from the bill in the Senate due to opposition from the White House and
concern that a White House inspector general's activities might violate
separation of powers principles.' The separation of powers concerns
may well be legitimate, 47 and the bill attempted to accommodate those

ago. That's a lot of turnover in an office whose principal goal is supposed to be to provide
the president with steady legal advice.").
For an excellent discussion of how the White House Counsel's role has changed over
time, see Michael Strine, Counselsto the President: The Rise of OrganizationalCompetition
in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY & PRESIDENTIAL PoImcS 257-80
(Cornell W. Clayton ed. 1995); see also Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the
Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17.
42. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, Clinton Apologizes for "Glitches in White House Handling
of Events; President'sExplanation of Missteps Doesn't Precisely Match the Facts, WASH.
POST, May 28, 1993, at A14.
43. George Lardner Jr., Eleventh-Hour Covenant: Lost Memory Computes to Gain for
Bush, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1993, at A12 ("When President Clinton's top aides moved into
the White House in January, many of them had trouble getting their computers to work.
That's because during... President Bush's last hours in office[,J officials wiped out the
computerized memory of the White House machines."). See also Devroy, supra note 42
("Clinton acknowledged ... that there had been 'glitches' in his handling of events and
problems, caused by his inexperience, and that of his staff.").
44. H.R. 3872, 104th Cong. (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H8103 (remarks of Rep. Bass).
45. H.R. 3452, 104th Cong. (1996).
46. 142 CONG. REC. E1931 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Mica) (indicating
that the White House opposed the inspector general provision and noting that the
Presidential and Executive Office Accountability Act "had been watered down in a number
of areas, mostly as a result of administration pressure").
47. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois to Hon. William F.
Clinger, July 24, 1996, reprinted at 142 CONG. REC. H10814-15 (Sept. 24, 1996). See also
Douglas S. Onley, Note, Treading On Sacred Ground: Congress'sPower to Subject White
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concerns in the same way as the legislation creating an inspector general
for the Central Intelligence Agency."
It is not surprising that the current occupants of the White House
objected to the creation of an inspector general for that institution. To
the extent that inspectors general focus on rooting out wrongdoing, they
provide ammunition to the political opposition. But to the degree that
inspectors general make recommendations for improved operation of a
government institution, they can provide an invaluable aid to good
government and prevent future scandals.49
Creating an inspector general for the White House may not eliminate
the need for the Independent Counsel Statute. Clearly, the Inspector
General at the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
was unable to prevent the massive wrongdoing that occurred at HUD
during the 1980s and 1990s.0 Nonetheless, there are at least two
reasons to install an inspector general in the White House, First, an
inspector general could reduce the need for independent counsel
investigations by making nonpartisan recommendations for improving
the administration of the White House, thus preventing future Travelgate-like scandals. Second, the growing unpopularity of the independent
counsel mechanism calls into question whether the Independent Counsel
Statute will be reauthorized when the current statute expires in 1999.51

House Advisors to Senate Confirmation, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1183 (1996); Charles
Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive
Power, 63 B.U. L. REv. 59 (1983).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-193 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403(q) (1994)). 142 CONG.
REC. H10816 (Sept. 24, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Clinger describing the similarity between
the White House inspector general and the CIA inspector general).

49. Paul Light provides an interesting and nuanced discussion of these conflicting roles
of inspectors general. See LIGHT, supra note 32, at 68:

The inspectors general were to be neither the lone wolf.., nor the strong right
arm .... The inspectors general ended up being a bit of both, ready to... alert[]
Congress of flagrant abuse while remaining under the general supervision of their
secretaries and administrators, empowered to audit and investigate without
interference while staying faithful members of the President's subcabinet.
50. LIGHT, supra note 32, at 100-02 (discussing how the inspector general at HUD was
unable to prevent the massive corruption at HUD). "As for the influence-peddling scheme

at the top of the agency, the IGs simply were not equipped to pursue such high-level
wrongdoing. Their task was primarily to look down for scandal, not up ....
The
inspectors general are not independent counsels nor are they given the special authority

needed for high-level investigations." Id. at 112. The independent counsel investigation
of fraud at HUD has continued for eight years and cost more than twenty-seven million
dollars. Clark, supra note 2, at Table I.
51. See Jonathon Weisman, Whatever Starr Does, Everyone Says That Law Must Go,
PIS. POST-GAZ., Mar. 21, 1998, at A16.
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If we are left without an Independent Counsel Statute, there is even
greater need for increased accountability in the White House.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article is intended to broaden the discussion of the Independent
Counsel Statute. Rather than focusing on the specific problems with the
operation of the statute, it points out that the independent counsel
mechanism plays a relatively small role in making government a more
ethical institution, and it discusses what other mechanisms (besides
criminal prosecution) are needed to promote more ethical government.
Our current obsession with investigating and prosecuting individual
wrongdoing may actually prove counterproductive in our efforts to
promote ethical government, promoting instead public cynicism about
government. To counteract this emphasis on individual wrongdoing, we
need to pay more attention to ensuring that government institutions are
designed to engender an ethical environment.
The inspector general mechanism helps promote an ethical environment because it institutionalizes organizational feedback. It gives
employees and others a safe place to voice their complaints and enables
management to receive constructive criticism and recommendations from
within the organization. It is a management tool that enables government institutions to recognize and correct their own mistakes.
This proposal for an inspector general will certainly not be the last
word on the subject of White House ethics. But I believe that a debate
over this proposal can help us turn from vilifying individual wrongdoers-a useful political ploy-to the tamer but perhaps more important
work of actually improving the ethics of the White House.

